



THE INSPECTOR GENERAL OF THE AIR FORCE


NOVEMBER-DECEMBER 1997

# Office of Special Investigations

## The Invisible Sentinels



## features



p.9

### 4 Signature Article

Brig. Gen. Taylor outlines his vision of preserving AFOSI's legacy and protecting the future.

### 6 The Invisible Sentinels

Information on the AFOSI's capability and mission.

### 9 Lean Logistics 101

Reveals this fundamental change in Air Force logistics.

### 12 Personnel Reliability Program Administrative Certification Applies to All Commanders!

Screening and verifying a member's qualifications doesn't just apply to units with nuclear weapons!

### 14 Mission Ready

Helping you and your family become fully mission ready.

### 18 Using Radioactive Materials in the Air Force

Outlining important safety measures that must be followed when using radioactive materials.

### 26 Anatomy of a Management Review

Details what a management review is and what it means to Air Force units.

#### Statement of Ownership, Management, and Circulation

The United States Postal Service requires all publications to publish a statement of ownership, management, and circulation each year.

Title of Publication:	<i>TIG Brief</i>
USPS Publication No.:	8750-376X
Frequency of Issue:	Bi-monthly
Office of Publication:	HQ AFIA/CVC 9700 G Ave, SE Suite 378J Kirtland AFB NM 87117-5670
Publisher:	Air Force Printing
Editor:	Capt. Angela Hicks
Owner:	None
Total copies printed:	28,049
Copies distributed:	27,949
Copies not distributed:	100
Total copies distributed and not distributed:	28,049

## departments

- 16 Crossfeed
- 20 Inspector's Section
- 22 Investigator's Dossiers
- 23 Auditor's Files
- 24 Legally Speaking



p.14

---

The Inspector General Brief  
AFRP 90-1  
November-December 1997  
Volume 49, Number 6

---

**GEN. MICHAEL E. RYAN**  
Chief of Staff, USAF

**LT. GEN. RICHARD T. SWOPE**  
The Inspector General, USAF

**COL. JAMES C. ROBERTSON III**  
Commander, Air Force Inspection Agency

**CAPT. ANGELA L. HICKS**  
Editor

**MS. DANITA T. BURNS**  
Assistant Editor

## on our cover

Cover illustration by  
Ms. Danita Burns.

**TIG Brief** (ISSN #8750-376X) is published bimonthly by the Air Force Inspector General, Air Force Inspection Agency, Kirtland Air Force Base, New Mexico 87117-5670. The **TIG Brief** (AFRP 90-1) provides authoritative guidance and information to commanders, inspectors general, inspectors, and other Air Force leaders at all levels of command. Periodicals mailing privileges postage paid at the United States Post Office, Albuquerque, NM 87101-9651 and additional mailing offices.

Address all correspondence to HQ AFIA/CVC, 9700 G Ave SE, Suite 378J, Kirtland AFB, NM 87117-5670. If sending electronically, use the Internet address:

**tig@smtps.saia.af.mil**. The phone number is DSN 246-1657 or commercial (505) 846-1657. You can also read the magazine on-line at **http://www-afia.saia.af.mil**.

No payment can be made for manuscripts submitted for publication in **TIG Brief**.

Contributions are welcome as are comments. The editor reserves the right to make any editorial changes in manuscripts. Air Force organizations are authorized to reprint articles from **TIG Brief** provided proper credit is given to the material used. The contents of this magazine are nondirective and should not be construed as regulations, technical orders, or directives unless so stated.

Distribution is made through CPDCs. POSTMASTER: Send address changes to: **TIG Brief** Editor, HQ AFIA/CVC, 9700 G Ave SE, Suite 378J, Kirtland AFB, NM 87117-5670.



**A**ir Force members are constantly challenged to predict and rapidly adapt to a global environment that changes at a rate never before seen. As we meet these new challenges, we must ensure the highest standards in protecting our people and safeguarding those weapon systems essential to a fast, flexible, and global Air Force. In this edition of **TIG Brief**, I want to highlight the important role the Air Force Office of Special Investigations plays in ensuring the capability of the force. Our increasing use of technology requires us to be vigilant in recognizing the dependencies and vulnerabilities

this technology brings. AFOSI is a recognized leader in the fight against computer-aided crime. Working closely with the Air Intelligence Agency, AFOSI also plays an important role in protecting vital command and control functions.

We possess the strongest Air Force in the world and our adversaries find the threat of terrorist attacks very attractive. AFOSI special agents are integrated with force protection elements everywhere and teamed with United States and host nation agencies around the world to identify the terrorist threat and advise commanders in the field, thus enhancing the protection of

our forces.

In addition to solving crimes of violence, AFOSI also plays a vital role in combating fraud directed at the Air Force, returning nearly one billion dollars to the federal government in the last three years.

Enjoying a fifty-year tradition of support to the Air Force, AFOSI is integral to the success of our core competencies of air and space superiority, global attack, rapid global mobility, precision engagement, information superiority, and agile combat support.

*Richard T. Swope*  
The Inspector General

# Preserving Our Legacy, Protecting the Future



by Brig. Gen. Francis X. Taylor

**T**he Air Force Office of Special Investigations has a proud past and an exciting future, filled with new challenges and opportunities to serve our nation's Air Force. It's a future the men and women of AFOSI look forward to exploring as we commemorate the golden anniversary of our agency's founding, Aug. 1, 1948.

Our motto, "Preserving our legacy, protecting the future," symbolizes and embodies the vital role we play for our nation's Air Force.

Our legacy and future as the Air Force's premier investigative agency are defined by three words that express the attributes our organization has cherished since its inception. These are service, integrity, and excellence.

We have served everywhere our Air Force has needed us. It was the AFOSI commander in Korea who first alerted Gen.

MacArthur's headquarters in Tokyo of the North Korean invasion in June 1950. We remained in Korea as the principal collector and provider of vital information to Air Force operational units.

In the 1960s and early 1970s, we were in Southeast Asia, gathering early warning threat information on sabotage and surprise attack in support of air base defense.

As terrorism became a household word in the 1970s, AFOSI responded with investigative tools and programs that enhanced the protection of Air Force people and resources.

In the 1980s, espionage by the former Soviet Union and its allies against the Air Force reached its peak. AFOSI's counterintelligence efforts helped identify and neutralize these efforts, playing a significant role in preserving our technological edge and combat capability.



With the collapse of communism, the 1990s have brought new challenges. Fighting to preserve the freedom of the people of Kuwait in Operation Desert Storm, AFOSI agents once again met the call of our nation's Air Force. Our presence in Southwest Asia continued to grow as the Air Force flew to prevent Iraq from again brutalizing its neighbors. One of our darkest hours occurred in June 1996 when terrorists bombed the Khobar Towers complex in an act of cowardice. The men and women of AFOSI were there, providing investigative assistance to our Air Force.

Today, we continue to add chapters to this heritage with our presence in the Balkans and various locations in Africa and Southwest Asia.

Integrity also defines the legacy and future of AFOSI. In fact, we were born out of the need the newly formed Air Force had for integrity in its procurement process. A major case highlighting abuses in the Army Air Corps' procurement process was the impetus for forming an agency that provided independent, unbiased, and centrally directed investigations of criminal activity in the new Air Force.

Since then, the integrity our people and our unbiased investigations bring to the force have

been the bedrock of our organization. Our code of ethics ensures the highest standards of conduct; our moral values ensure the deepest commitment to justice.


Every AFOSI investigation impacts someone's life. This makes it absolutely critical that our reporting be factual, unbiased, and accurate. Integrity is vital to all we do for our Air Force—it has been for 49 years and will remain so into the next millennium.

Excellence is the third attribute that describes AFOSI. Throughout the years, we have been benchmarked for our excellence. In the 1970s, AFOSI developed a forensics program that allowed us to create in-house expertise to solve the most difficult cases. It has been widely recognized as one of the best in the federal law enforcement community. In 1979, AFOSI created the first computer crime investigative capability in the federal government. Since then we have led the way in exploiting computer media for evidentiary purposes. Today, we continue to lead as the executive agency for the Department of Defense's new computer forensic media analysis laboratory. Our excellent counterintelligence efforts during Operation Desert Storm were recognized by the director of the CIA for their key contri-

bution to national security.

Our excellence is not measured in one extraordinary achievement. It is recorded in the daily journal of the lives of AFOSI people and the Air Force people and resources they protect. Our legacy of service, integrity, and excellence is intact and marches on today in the footsteps of the 11,000 men and women who have served in AFOSI. We pledge to preserve that legacy and dedicate ourselves to the great responsibility of providing the world-class investigative capability needed to protect our future.

As we begin to celebrate 50 years of serving our great nation, I salute our past and embrace our future. ♦



Commander, Air Force Office of Special Investigations

# The Invisible Sentinels

Lt. Col. Chris Orndorff  
HQ AFOSI/XOR DSN 297-7055  
orndorj@ogn.af.mil

**T**he Air Force Office of Special Investigations provides investigative support to the Air Force far beyond the commonly held, stereotypical view of the agency. Typically, when someone hears “OSI,” their immediate thought centers around narcotics investigations or fraudulent travel vouchers. Moreover, meeting an AFOSI special agent is, to some people, equivalent to seeing a state trooper in your rearview

mirror as you speed down the highway. Contrary to such perceptions, AFOSI, like supply or maintenance units working on the flightline, plays a critical, though often unnoticed, behind-the-scenes role ensuring the Air Force remains the world’s premier air and space power. In this regard, AFOSI’s mission supports every Air Force core competency and is aimed at “keeping the sword sharp,” as it were, through its primary criminal,

Installation commanders don’t own AFOSI because the office is charted to provide independent, unbiased, and centrally directed investigations of criminal activity in the Air Force. This avoids the appearance of bias and improper command influence by senior commanders in any investigation conducted by AFOSI.

fraud, and counterintelligence investigative roles. These investigative disciplines form a corporate whole, working together to protect Air Force and Department of Defense people, operations, and materiel worldwide. Since AFOSI plays an important protective role in the defense of Air Force and Department of Defense assets, it is important for all Air Force members to understand how AFOSI contributes to U.S. air power.

As noted above, AFOSI's mission is divided into three general investigative categories: criminal, fraud, and counterintelligence. In all three of these mission areas, AFOSI skillfully makes use of advanced technologies and proven interpersonal techniques to uncover and clearly present the facts behind each investigation to Air Force commanders responsible for command action. The best known investigative mission involves general criminal investigations which include major crimes ranging

from child abuse to death cases. A basic, underlying tenet is that AFOSI is responsible for uncovering the truth; agents are as responsible for proving innocence as they are for proving guilt. Moreover, once an investigation is complete, it is the commander's responsibility—not AFOSI's—to take appropriate action based on the results of the investigation.

AFOSI never recommends the commander's ultimate action—it just furnishes the relevant facts that allow the commander to assess the situation for appropriate action, if warranted.

AFOSI also has a mission to investigate fraud. These cases range from multimillion dollar fraud in the procurement of major weapon systems to base-level contract fraud. AFOSI's

In general, financial, facility, and logistics support for AFOSI is the responsibility of the host and parent commands. Other requirements are negotiated between the base and servicing AFOSI unit through host-tenant support agreements. AFOSI funds temporary duty and personnel costs.

responsibility in these investigations is to help ensure the Air Force gets the reliable capability it needs at the agreed upon price. The other investigative mission—counterintelligence—is perhaps the least familiar. Here, AFOSI prevents foreign intelligence entities from gaining access to classified Air Force information and materials. The counterintelligence function also supports force protection and antiterrorism activities.

AFOSI provides several types of specialized investigative support to the Air Force and the Department of Defense. Among these are protective service operations. These “secret service” type operations are conducted by AFOSI special agents to ensure the safety of top-level military, civilian, and foreign dignitaries. Similarly, to ensure the security of sensitive Air Force facilities, AFOSI technical services use electronic and video equipment for surveillances, legal wire-taps, and countermeasures.

Another investigative specialty AFOSI offers is forensic sciences. These specially trained agents provide expert

The investigation of criminal drug activity is the largest single case category of AFOSI investigations conducted annually. Marijuana cases make up nearly two-thirds of AFOSI's total narcotics case load. In the vast majority of drug investigations, the Air Force member was a user, as opposed to a supplier of drugs.



AFOSI does not investigate every case. We are charted to investigate felony crimes. Allegations of nonfelony or less serious crimes are better dealt with via command, inspectors general, or security forces channels.

support in processing crime scenes for evidence and reconstruction of events. While one normally associates a crime scene with a death or robbery, modern crime scenes often involve computers which agents must also process as evidence. This calls for AFOSI's computer crime specialists. Such investigations may involve searching personal computers or systems for specific files and investigating hackers' attempted penetrations into Air Force systems, both which help maintain information superiority.

Other special investigative tools include use of polygraph and clinical psychology which may support any one of AFOSI's primary mission areas. Special projects provides investigative, counterintelligence, and security support to Air Force special access programs, working to prevent the illegal transfer of critical technology to other powers or entities. All these specialties work together to support the Air Force and contribute to its core competencies.

AFOSI's four operational priorities illustrate how the command stacks up its limited resources on the relevant issues

for the Air Force.

The top priority is counterintelligence support to force protection. Providing counterintelligence that proactively identifies, engages, and prevents intelligence and terrorist threats to Air Force people and resources is absolutely vital.

The second priority is investigation of violence impacting the Air Force. Maintaining a safe, nonviolent working and living environment on Air Force bases is critical for mission accomplishment and the welfare of airmen and their families.

The third priority's objective, support for information superiority, is to protect Air Force information systems through the proactive engagement against hackers and other computer criminals who target Air Force systems for alteration or destruction.

The fourth operational priority, major systems procurement fraud, helps maintain the integrity of the Air Force's weapons procurement process. By identifying and investigating contractors who criminally defraud the Air Force, AFOSI helps preserve flight safety, saving money and lives.

In all of the mission priorities, all specialties work together to provide a synergistic whole that helps protect Air Force people and resources.

The corporate AFOSI, through its mission priorities, supports all six Air Force core competencies. Air and space superiority, global attack, rapid global mobility, precision engagement, information superiority, and agile combat support are all better able to function because of the protective services provided by AFOSI. From preventing the transfer of critical technologies and use of substandard materials in weapon systems to deterring hostile acts against U.S. forces, AFOSI stands in the background, as a sentinel, many times unseen, but always there supporting the flying mission of the Air Force. ♦

AFOSI uses specially selected and trained volunteer special agents in a variety of undercover roles, often using fictitious identities in order to penetrate selected criminal, fraud, and counterintelligence targets that cannot be neutralized by routine investigative means. Commanders will be kept informed of information developed as a result of such operations.





Lt. Col. Gil Van Wagner  
Mr. Larry Hickerson  
HQ AFIA/AIS DSN 246-1706  
hickersl@smtps.saia.af.mil

**L**ean Logistics represents a fundamental change in Air Force logistics. It affects everyone who orders, manages, moves, stores, repairs, or otherwise handles parts, as well as every operator. This evolving change through Lean Logistics addresses such realities as decreasing resources, declining personnel numbers, and increased mobility tasks. There are more than 100 initiatives covered by the broad umbrella of Lean Logistics.

### **Two-Level Maintenance Paved the Way**

Lessons learned as a result of the shift from three-level maintenance to two-level maintenance provided the basis for many principles of Lean Logistics. As units transferred intermediate maintenance responsibilities for some systems from the field to a central repair facility, often at a depot, the logistics process was

seen through new eyes. The capability of fast transportation via commercial carriers such as Federal Express, DHL, and Emery, was tested and proven under the two-level approach. Units streamlined the base repair process and evacuated two-level maintenance spares from the aircraft to transportation channels in two days. This process used to average 10 or more days. Commercial carriers proved dependable and delivered reparable assets to depots quickly and efficiently. This increased reliance on fast transportation shaped many long-term decisions for Lean Logistics. This capability allowed reduced stock levels in the field and a smaller mobility footprint as less repair capability was deployed.

Two-level maintenance also highlighted the dependence of reparables awaiting repair on a few critical parts. Consolidating these assets awaiting parts

showed the benefit of expediting procurement for a few critical parts as the large awaiting parts numbers began surfacing.

Decreasing budgets, reduced spares, and two-level maintenance all worked to force answers on how to better use existing spares. Moving spares quickly around the globe instead of having stockpiles everywhere was a way to address the problem. Lean Logistics became the program to formalize these changes. **Air Force Materiel Command Changes Depot Repair**

As the primary Air Force supplier, AFMC faced revolutionary changes in the logistics arena. For decades, depot repair was based on batch processing of predicted requirements. Shops determined what to repair each quarter and were evaluated on how efficiently they met that projection. Repairing in large batches was the

most efficient way to meet repair projections. Unfortunately, field units ordered small quantities of many items. As a result, some shops repaired items not required, affectionately called “buggy whips,” and some vital spares were not repaired because of small volume. The depots were achieving the efficiencies of quarterly projections but not providing what was needed to the field. This occurred at depots and at contractor repair facilities.

Enter the senior leaders materiel course! This course, presented in February 1996 by then AFMC Commander General Henry Viccellio, outlined a bold, new vision to revitalize depot and contractor repair. The senior leader materiel course told the world about the depot repair and the contractor repair enhancement program. Building upon the previous depot reengineering efforts, these programs evolved from the field-level intermediate repair enhancement program. A direct descendant of the mission capability and due-in-from-maintenance meeting, the intermediate repair enhancement program was a monthly forum where key base repair personnel reviewed the entire process. This item-by-item review ensured the right items were repaired. Bottle-necks were addressed and corrective action initiated. The more in depth the intermediate repair enhancement program, the better the base repair process. The senior leaders mate-

riel course adapted the intermediate repair enhancement program into the depot and contractor repair enhancement programs for depot-level repairs.

Repair on demand became the order of the day. AFMC launched a major program to convert the entire depot repair process from batch processing to a more customer-responsive repair on demand. The prototype program for the conversion was called PACER LEAN, initiated in July 1996. Each depot identified two shops and two contracts as prototypes for depot and contractor repair enhancement programs. PACER LEAN touched every part of depot operations for the selected shops. It required a completely new computer program to induct items into the execution and prioritization repair support system, otherwise known as EXPRESS. The flow of parts was streamlined and assets awaiting parts were moved right to the shop floor. There were personnel shuffles to move people to common shops and forge a new sense of teamwork in the prototype shops. Parts identified as PACER LEAN or Lean Logistics were tagged for quick movement and expedited repair. The results of the test drove AFMC to begin to deploy the depot repair enhancement program on April 1, 1997, with full depot conversion planned by the end of the calendar year.

**Evolution Continues**

Lean Logistics has driven significant changes to Air Force

processes, but much remains ahead. The changes have been so dynamic that people and processes have often had a hard time keeping up. Changes to the processes highlighted problems long buried by the old methods. A highly responsive logistics process demanded more responsive computer systems, total asset visibility, enhanced communications, and time-definite worldwide parts delivery. Logisticians around the globe are working these issues as they surface. Meanwhile, teamwork and communication become vital stopgaps for system inefficiencies. Any part held too long at any step delays the entire process. While the air staff works to develop and promote Lean Logistics principles and initiatives, it's everyone's job to move assets quickly and ensure the old mindset of massive “just-in-case” stockpiles fades to an old war story of how things were. ♦

So, you think you know about Lean Logistics. Here's your chance to find out. The questions on the following page are based on information from the official *Air Force Baseline Lean Logistics Master Plan and Road Map*, Version 4.0, draft, dated Jan. 31, 1996, from Headquarters Air Force, Directorate of Maintenance. The answers are available at the end of the quiz. Go ahead and put your knowledge of the biggest change to Air Force logistics to the test.

# Lean Logistics 101 Quiz

1. The goal of Lean Logistics initiatives is to reduce previous pipeline times by
  - a. at least 200 percent.
  - b. not letting anything remain in one spot.
  - c. relying on a “cannibalization first” method.
  - d. 50 percent or more.
2. One of the baseline requirements for Lean Logistics shifts inventories to
  - a. the source of repair.
  - b. defense reutilization and marketing office.
  - c. purely “just in time” purchases.
  - d. only the highest priorities.
3. The more robust system under Lean Logistics
  - a. costs much more over the long term.
  - b. is less sensitive to a specific mix or levels of demands that might arise.
  - c. offsets higher breakage rates with quicker repairs.
  - d. factors in an acceptable “hangar queen” rate.
4. As a result of Lean Logistics, costs will
  - a. decrease in short term but gradually return to existing levels.
  - b. increase initially but reduce in every cost element over the long term.
  - c. reduce overall although some individual cost elements might increase.
  - d. not be a factor because the focus is strictly on mission capability.
5. Under Lean Logistics, the transition from peacetime operations to wartime
  - a. must be smooth and effective without special, ad-hoc procedures.
  - b. will require redistribution of central inventories to forward stockpiles.
  - c. forces a fundamental shift of repair from depots to intermediate levels.
  - d. accepts unasserted operations in wartime as a reality.
6. Some of the strategies that support time-definite distribution for Lean Logistics are
  - a. door-to-door delivery, quick-zip packaging, in-transit visibility, and retrograde priority.
  - b. node reduction, in-transit visibility, express wartime delivery, and quick-zip packaging.
  - c. retrograde priority, door-to-door delivery, node reduction, and in-transit visibility.
  - d. quick-zip packaging, express wartime delivery, door-to-door delivery, and retrograde priority.
7. Under Lean Logistics, stock management principles include
  - a. an increased reliance on economic order quantity purchases.
  - b. a large central stockpile of assets waiting to be used.
  - c. maximum expected back orders at base level.
  - d. smaller lot sizes for economic order quantity purchases.
8. Lean Logistics metrics are divided into several groups to include
  - a. program maturity, stock measures, costs, and rates.
  - b. pipeline segment flow times, stock measures, costs, and rates.
  - c. pipeline segment flow times, weapons systems development reduction, costs, and rates.
  - d. pipeline segment flow times, stock measures, costs, and reduction of phone calls to item managers.
9. The nodes of the pipeline flow time under Lean Logistics are
  - a. field handling, retrograde, and Federal Express costs.
  - b. field repair, order and ship time, and depot repair.
  - c. retrograde, order and ship time, and depot repair.
  - d. Federal Express costs, depot repair, and retrograde.
10. Lean Logistics
  - a. is designed to improve operational capability.
  - b. integrates state-of-the-art business practices across all logistics functions.
  - c. is entirely consistent with the Department of Defense logistics system vision.
  - d. all of the above and even more.

## How did you do?

**9-10 correct:** You understand Lean Logistics and are ready for the future.

**6-8 correct:** You know a little about Lean Logistics and possibly made a good guess or two. Recommend you review a copy of the master plan and road map. This will clear up any rough spots you had while answering the quiz.

**3-5 correct:** Lean Logistics is just a program you heard about and you thought you could bluff your way through the quiz. Recommend you get a copy of the master plan and road map and discuss it with your co-workers to ensure the whole team knows the future direction of Air Force logistics.

**0-2 correct:** You took the test for fun and found out this Lean Logistics is harder than you imagined. Unless you increase your knowledge of the many changes due to Lean Logistics, you will wonder what happened to the system as it leaves you behind.

The answers are: 1. d, 2. a, 3. b, 4. c, 5. a, 6. c (Hint—There is no such thing as quick-zip packaging—yet), 7. d, 8. b, 9. c, 10. d.

# Personnel Reliability Program Administrative Certification Applies to All Commanders!

Senior Master Sgt. Kenneth L. Harris  
HQ AFIA/FO DSN 246-2272

Administrative  
*prp*  
**RELI**  
*DECER*

Personnel reliability program? “Sorry but that doesn’t apply to my unit—we don’t have any nukes.” Have you made or heard that statement lately? It could very well be true. Then again, have you forgotten about the administrative certification you completed on Senior Master Sgt. Murray qualifying her for a projected assignment? If so, you do have a personnel reliability program.

Members scheduled to perform nuclear weapons duties at their next assignment must be administratively certified by you, the losing commander. You must make sure the member is screened and meets program requirements before conducting the administrative certification. Once the certification is completed, your job isn’t finished. You must monitor the member until his or her departure for any potentially disqualifying information that may render the member ineligible

for nuclear weapons duties.

A functional management review of the *Nuclear Weapons Personnel Reliability Program (PRP)*, Program Number 96-608, conducted by the Air Force Inspection Agency provided insight into administrative certifications. Before conducting your next administrative certification, consider these steps to enhance the quality of your certification.

Keep in mind the program’s objective: ensure only the most reliable members perform nuclear weapons duties.

Review Air Force Instruction 36-2104, *Nuclear Weapons Personnel Reliability Program*, and the current military personnel flight memorandum addressing administrative certification processing prior to conducting any certification.

Your goal is to complete the certification within 30 days of assignment acknowledgment.

**This step is extremely important.** If an updated security



# ion Certification ABLE program TIFY PRP personnel *thirty days of assignment acknowledgement*

investigation is required, you must ensure one is submitted prior to completing the administrative certification. If needed, ask your military personnel flight, personnel reliability program monitor, or security manager for help in determining the correct security investigation to submit.

Review the member's entire personnel record, unit personnel information file, and personnel security investigation request forms. Also review the unfavorable information files and control roster actions if applicable. You are looking for any documented alcohol or drug incidents, patterns of misconduct, poor performance, and the like. Remember, gathering of this information is to assist you in evaluating the member's ability to perform nuclear weapons-related duties. It is also an excellent idea to communicate with the gaining commander. If the member is going to a munitions support

squadron, you must discuss any potentially disqualifying information with them prior to their permanent change of station—this is mandatory.

If, after reviewing the member's personnel records, you decide the member meets reliability standards, forward the certification documents to the medical treatment facility. They will conduct a review of the member's medical records for any potentially disqualifying information.

Upon receipt of the medical records review, decide if the results of the review warrant certification.

At this point you should have a good understanding of the member's documented reliability. Now discuss with the member any questionable items from the personnel and medical record reviews. At the same time, brief the member on the "spirit and intent" of the personnel reliability program.

Using the results of your

records reviews and the member's interview, either certify or decertify. Certification is complete when the commander and member sign the certification document.

Once certified, ensure reliability standards are maintained by continually monitoring the member.

If, at any time, you believe the member should not work around nuclear weapon systems, you must permanently decertify them. The individual must be notified in writing of their decertification and given the opportunity for rebuttal. Some permanent decertifications *are* reversible when the disqualifying factor is no longer present. In the end, ask yourself, "Have I met the goal of ensuring only the most reliable members perform nuclear weapons duties?" Remember, the gaining commander is depending on you. ♦

# Mission Ready



U.S. Air Force Photo.

## More than Just Packing your Bags

**Editor's note:** This article was written to raise questions and challenge your view that you and your troops are as ready as you can be and, hopefully, encourage a broader view of what constitutes "fully mission ready."

Capt. Ed Hurston  
HQ USAFE/SGPXO DSN 480-6983  
hurstone@usafe21.ramstein.af.mil

**A**re your bags packed? "What a question ... of course my bags are packed. I'm ready! When do I deploy?"

Force structure reductions and operations tempo increases have resulted in an increasing proportion of Air Force members deployed. For example: between 1994 and 1996, United States Air Forces in Europe saw a 33 percent increase in the number of personnel deployed. In 1994, USAFE deployed 15.3 percent of all assigned personnel for extended periods. By 1996, that proportion had increased to one in five of all members assigned to the major command. A portion of that increase may be attributable to efforts to reduce the average temporary duty assignment from 108 days in 1994 to 82 days in 1996. However, the fact remains that we all have a much greater opportunity to serve away from our home station. We might even go with very short notice, under other than "comfortable conditions."

The bottom line here is that we, as leaders, determine the level of personal preparedness

and readiness of our troops. Not only does this pertain to their technical competence to accomplish the operational mission but also to assure that they and their loved ones are provided for in the event of a short-notice tasking. In this sense, as in operational missions, situational awareness is everything. We are sending large numbers of our personnel into hostile environments and areas of climatic extremes: Balkan mountains in winter, equatorial jungles in Latin America, and Africa in the summer. Are you and your troops psychologically, as well as physically, prepared to meet the challenges? Are you and your troops aware of the benefits to which you and your families are entitled in the event of death or injury?

Answers to questions your troops need to know before deploying:

*question*  
**What is a will?**

*answer*  
A will is a legal document that gives instructions to a personal representative about how to distribute assets of your

estate to the beneficiaries. A will may create "peace of mind" by making arrangements for the care of minor children, appointing a guardian for a minor child, establishing a trust for children, or giving certain items of personal property to certain people.

*question*  
**What is a durable power of attorney for health care and how is it different from a living will?**

*answer*  
A durable power of attorney is a special type of power of attorney. While most powers of attorney are revoked when the principal becomes disabled or incapacitated, a durable power of attorney includes language that allows the agent—the person to whom you have given the power of attorney—to continue exercising it on your behalf. A durable power of attorney for health-care decisions informs the doctor that the person you have empowered understands your wishes and will act to carry out the health-care decisions you would make if you were competent. A living will is a legal document which instructs medical personnel not to use artificial life support if you

become terminally ill and are rendered incompetent to make your own treatment decisions.

What is a death gratuity, how much is it, where does one get it, and what is it for?

The death gratuity is a \$6,000 lump sum paid to eligible beneficiaries of a member who dies on active duty, designed to help the survivors meet immediate financial needs during their readjustment. The casualty assistance representative will present this payment to the next of kin within 24 hours of notification of death.

What are the rights and entitlements of survivors in the event of a service member's death while on active duty?

A whole host of entitlements and benefits is available to members injured on active duty and survivors of members who die on active duty. While a detailed listing and thorough explanation is available in Air Force Instruction 36-3002, *Casualty Services*, Attachment 21, the following is a quick run down of some of the more significant benefits: death gratuity, unpaid pay and allowances, survivor benefit plan, dependent travel and shipment of household goods, burial benefits, medical benefits, base exchange access, transient quarters, financial assistance, social security benefits, U.S. Department of Veterans' Affairs Benefits and a variety of miscellaneous benefits. It is important for families

to know of these matters before they are actually needed.

If a member is being sustained on a life support system without any hope of recovery, what is in the best financial interests of the family: have the member medically retired or be allowed to die on active duty?

Have them medically retired! As an example, consider a captain with 10 years of service with no children. If allowed to die on active duty, the monthly benefit by the dependency and indemnity compensation is \$810. However, if medically retired before death and survivor benefit plan is elected, the monthly benefit is \$1,348 per month, a difference of \$538 per month, for an annual difference of \$6,456.

Have you had blood drawn for your DNA analysis?

If not, do so at the flight surgeon's office before you deploy. This is essential for identification of remains in the event of a traumatic death which renders a body unidentifiable.

Are your immunizations current?

If you have a question about immunizations, call or visit the military public health office at your local medical facility.

When was the last time you inventoried your mobility bag—do you have any expired or dated items like medications in there and where is your second pair of

eye glasses?

Nobody knows that but you.

Does your family know what services are available at the family support center and the mental health clinic?

Mental health clinics often see an increase in demand for services when units deploy. Your family advocacy outreach program manager and chaplain's office are good resources for classes and support functions which can help family members deal with stress, depression, or adjustment issues.

Is your spouse ready: for you to deploy on short notice; for the possibility of you being injured, or not coming back at all; to be notified as the next-of-kin in the event of injury or death?

You tell us.

While you may be ready to do the operational mission, a better question may be, "Are your family and your troop's families as well prepared as they could be?" These, and many other questions, should be asked in addition to, "Are your bags packed?" The answers are out there—are you asking the questions? For more information, contact your casualty assistance representative in your military personnel flight customer service section, your family support center, your mental health clinic, and your base legal office and be ready! ♦



# Uncovering Good Ideas in Integrated Weapon System Management

Ms. Kay M. Jeffers  
Maj James B. Custodio  
HQ AFIA/AI DSN 246-1691  
custodij@smtps.saia.af.mil

**W**hen Air Force Materiel Command implemented integrated weapon system management, it encouraged an open environment for experimentation by minimizing guidance on system program office structure and how system program directors should run their programs. This policy empowered program directors to create their own practices and tools to meet their needs primarily based on common sense and getting the job done. Many “good ideas” were generated with the implementation of integrated weapons system management in the areas of communications, requirements planning and problem solving, training and team building, and program management.

**Communications:** Bridging the gap between geographically separated product and logistics centers significantly challenged

system program offices during the early phases of integrated weapon system management. A variety of media was used to connect program office personnel with each other and their customers. Publications such as magazines and newsletters informed program office personnel of the latest official and unofficial activities at product and logistics center locations. Magazines, although costly and difficult to produce, were attractive, useful, and contained information suitable for a wider audience than newsletters.

A number of system program offices used computer networks and management information systems to communicate. As communication tools, networks allowed real-time access and sharing of data between centers, users, and contractors. Despite infrastructure problems, a majority of system program offices were



using computers as their preferred method for exchanging data. Some organizations established worldwide web home pages to disseminate program information and acquisition policy such as team member E-mail addresses and the program director's infonet. Some program offices installed dedicated wide area networks to enhance data exchanges and anticipate future connectivity requirements. Video teleconferencing was another electronic method used by program offices as an alternative to temporary duty travel. Several program offices used video teleconferencing for staff and board meetings between product and logistics center personnel.

**Requirements Planning and Problem Solving:** Requirements definition and quick resolution of operational field problems were top concerns of system program offices. Users needed easy and reliable access to these offices. Conversely, program office personnel needed a standard process to communicate and resolve users' requirements and concerns. Requirements review boards or councils were one method to deal with varying user needs. A number of system program offices used toll-free telephone numbers to connect with users. Another approach by users was familiarizing program office personnel with the operational environment of weapon sys-


tems through visits to operational locations.

**Training and Team Building:** Under integrated weapon system management, system program offices immediately recognized the need for training personnel and building good teams, particularly with product and logistics centers in different locations. Formal training courses offered by institutions did not provide training for program office-unique processes. Training programs were created to familiarize personnel with the program office's mission and functions. Team building initiatives emphasized a one-system program office philosophy between geographically separated team members and improved working relationships. Many system program offices had on-site visits to product and logistics centers, operational bases, and contractor facilities. Others placed more emphasis on awards to teams consisting of acquisition and sustainment personnel versus individual awards.

**Program Management:** Managing programs at product and logistics centers at different locations was a challenge for program offices under integrated weapon system management. Swift decision making required unique approaches to ensure consideration of criteria from all program office locations and functions. For example, many offices created

corporate boards or steering committees primarily consisting of the director, functional chiefs, team leaders, and users to determine critical acquisition and sustainment activities. Some program offices had product and logistics center personnel present via electronic media at configuration control boards, staff meetings, and meetings with users and contractors.

**Summary:** Integrated weapon system management stimulated system program office innovativeness and initiative resulting in a variety of best practices. The next step in the evolution of the integrated weapon system management philosophy is to take these good ideas and institutionalize them for the benefit of all program offices. Acquisition Management Report, PN 96-505, *Implementation of the Integrated Weapon System Management (IWSM) Philosophy*, published Dec. 10, 1996, contains examples of best practices initiated by a few of the integrated weapon system management system program offices. The report includes points of contact should you desire more information to help you implement these good ideas in your organization. ♦



# Using Radioactive Materials in the Air Force

Maj. Richard Speer  
HQ AFIA/SGM DSN 240-1517  
speerr@smtps.saia.af.mil

**T**he use of radioactive materials plays an important part in the Air Force mission. Whether the use is aiding troops in the field in the detection of chemical agents or treating cancer in a medical facility's nuclear medicine department, there are important safety rules to follow.

Before anyone can possess and use radioactive materials, they must obtain permission in the form of a license from the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. The commission issued the Air Force a master material license covering most uses of radioactive materials throughout the Air Force. The master material license also gives the Air Force broad authority to regulate many of the day-to-day aspects of radioactive material use.

Radiation safety is addressed in Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations and Air Force Instruction 40-201,

*Managing Radioactive Materials in the USAF*. The Air Force Radioisotope Committee has overall responsibility for managing and regulating radiation safety in the Air Force. This group issues radioactive material permits which function in place of individual commission licenses. They authorize units to procure and use radioactive materials and provide additional specific requirements for users to follow.

## **Permit Compliance**

Although the Nuclear Regulatory Commission inspects some Air Force radioactive material permit holders directly, the Air Force Inspection Agency, specifically, a health physicist assigned to the directorate of medical inspection, monitors most permit compliance. Consistent with commission practice, permit compliance inspections are usually

conducted with little or no advance notice. While conducting intense program "reviews" prior to an inspection is often the norm, radiation safety managers should conduct their safety programs at all times in full compliance with radiation safety regulations.

The Air Force Inspection Agency has during the past three years, conducted inspections which included a healthy dose of "staff assistance." Inspectors provide helpful ideas, details of "best practices" seen at other bases, and the latest regulatory information to enable permit holders to manage more effective radiation safety programs.

By necessity, the major portion of the permit inspection is still compliance oriented. Managers must be keenly aware of the regulatory requirements for possessing and using radioactive materials and ensure they pay close attention to the details.

### **Inspection Trends**

Periodically, the Air Force Radioisotope Committee reviews radioactive material inspection reports to determine any trends in inspection findings that might require attention. Being aware of these trends will help radiation safety managers conduct their individual program reviews.

During 1996, 100 radioactive material permit inspections were conducted, resulting in

115 violations of Nuclear Regulatory Commission or Air Force regulations. While many permit inspections resulted in no violations, the overall violation rate was 1.2 per inspected permit. Violations occurred most often in the broad areas of inventory and leak testing, periodic surveys, and shipping and receiving.

**1** Inventory and leak test violations typically involved missing or incomplete documentation. With some exceptions, inventory and leak tests are required by specific conditions described in the radioactive material permit and must be performed at six-month intervals. Accurate and complete documentation will be the only evidence that radiation safety managers have complied with these requirements. Note that Air Force Instruction 40-201 requires specific information regarding the identification and location of the radioactive materials be included in the leak test and inventory documentation.

**2** Periodic surveys in restricted and unrestricted areas around radioactive material storage and use areas must be performed at intervals sufficient to ensure compliance with personnel dose limits. The usual maximum survey interval is annually.

When conducting these surveys, be especially aware of requirements in Title 10, paragraph 20.1302 to comply

with the 100 millirem per year public dose limit. Usually, complying with the dose limit itself is not a problem. However, many survey reports have not adequately documented compliance determination.

**3** Maintaining complete records of radioactive material receipts and shipments has also been a chronic problem. The permit holder must keep a complete record of the receipt of radioactive materials including copies of shipping documents as well as a complete records of any radioactive material shipments made by the permit holder.

There are also specific survey requirements which include documenting most package receipts and shipments of materials. Many of these records must be kept on file as long as the permit is in place.

Radiation safety managers should review Air Force Instruction 40-201 and Title 10 for the specific requirements for these compliance items.

By taking note of commonly identified violations and assuring full compliance and documentation, radioactive material users should score well during their next permit compliance inspection and avoid potential noncompliance with the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. ♦

# Special Interest Items

The Air Force Inspection Agency publishes this schedule of special interest items to advise inspectors at all levels of current inspection efforts and to encourage crossfeed of inspection guides and information. The schedule contains ongoing Air Force, major command, and forward operating unit special interest items. Please direct all questions regarding the accuracy of this page and its contents to Lt. Col. Ohman, DSN 246-1575, [ohmana@smtps.saia.af.mil](mailto:ohmana@smtps.saia.af.mil) and questions concerning specific items to the agency monitors listed below. Units without active special interest items are not included in this listing.

## USAF

**Lt. Col. Ohman**  
**DSN 246-1575**

### 96-03

Government Bills of Lading Accountability  
Expires: July 31, 1998

### 97-01

Hazardous Materials Management  
Expired: Oct. 31, 1997

## ACC

**Ms. Brehm**  
**DSN 574-8710**

### 94-01

Joint Oil Analysis Program  
Expires: Indefinite

### 95-02

American Express Program  
Management  
Expires: Indefinite

### 95-04

Management of ACC Culture and  
Leadership Survey  
Expires: Indefinite

### 97-03

Abort Decisions  
Expires: Indefinite

## AETC

**Lt. Col. Oncale**  
**DSN 487-5344**

### 94-01

Automated Data Processing  
Equipment Accountability  
Expires: June 30, 1998

### 95-02

Simplified Acquisition of Base Engineer  
Requirements  
Expires: Nov. 31, 1997

### 96-01

In-Flight Communications Discipline  
Expires: Feb. 28, 1998

### 96-02

Recruiter Transition Program  
Expires: June 30, 1998

### 96-03

Sexual Harrassment  
Expires: Aug. 31, 1998

## AFMC

**Maj. Groce**  
**DSN 986-2276**

### 96-01

Elite Gate Guard  
Expires: April 10, 1998

### 96-02

Honor Guards  
Expired: April 18, 1997

### 96-03

Champion Wheels Program, Vehicle  
Maintenance  
Expires: May 1, 1998

### 96-05

Report of Survey Program  
Expires: June 12, 1998

### 97-01

Base On-the-Job Training Program  
Expires: July 31, 1998

## AFSOC

**Capt. Lewis**  
**DSN 579-2858**

### 96-01

Core Automated Maintenance System  
Expires: Indefinite

### 97-01

Aircraft Appearance and Condition  
Expires: Indefinite

## AFSPC

**Master Sgt. Gross**  
**DSN 834-6737**

### 95-02

Weapon Storage Area Security  
Enhancements  
Expires: Indefinite

### 95-04

Automated Data Processing Equipment  
Accounts and Maintenance  
Expired: Oct. 15, 1997

### 97-01

Operation of Private Organizations  
Expires: Feb. 28, 1998

### 97-02

Wear of the Space and Missile Crew  
Uniform and A-2 Leather Jacket  
Expires: Sept. 30, 1998

## AMC

**Tech. Sgt. Jackson-Hansen**  
**DSN 576-5975**

### 109

Passenger Manifesting and Control  
Expired: Oct. 21, 1997

## PACAF

**Chief Master Sgt. Errecart**  
**DSN 449-9316**

### 96-01

Night Cockpit Illumination  
Expires: Jan. 14, 1998

### 96-03

Air Combat Training with Similar Aircraft  
Expired: April 30, 1997

### 96-04

Dress and Appearance  
Expired: May 14, 1997



# Special Interest Items

## AFRC

**Master Sgt. Washington**  
DSN 497-1496

**015**

Appropriate Leave Status for Air Reserve Technicians When Performing Military Duty  
Expires: Dec. 31, 1997

**016**

Reporting and Documentation for the Airplane Pilot Trainee Programs  
Expires: Sept. 30, 1997

**018**

Corrosion Prevention and Aircraft Marking  
Expires: Oct. 1, 1998

**019**

Simplified Acquisition of Base Engineering Requirements  
Expires: Dec. 31, 1997

**021**

Fuel Systems Section Management  
Expires: May 31, 1999

**022**

Government Travel Card Program Management  
Expires: Dec. 31, 1997

**023**

Air Force Reserve Policy on Family Care  
Expires: March 1, 2000

**024**

International Merchant Purchase Authorization Card  
Expires: Indefinite

**026**

Training Documentation  
Expires: Jan. 30, 1998

**027**

Aircrew Qualification Review  
Expires: Sept. 30, 1998

## ANG

**Lt. Col. McClain**  
DSN 223-6377

**97-01**

Dual Compensation  
Expires: Aug. 1, 1998

**97-02**

Munitions Accountability, Storage, and Inspection  
Expires: March 1, 1998

## AIA

**Maj. Ryan**  
DSN 969-2891

**95-02**

Basic Allowance for Subsistence and Subsistence in Kind Review  
Expires: Sept. 30, 1997

**96-01**

Espirit De Corps  
Expires: Indefinite

**96-02**

Fatality and Suicide Prevention  
Expires: Nov. 1, 1997

**96-03**

Equipment Management  
Expires: July 31, 1997

**96-04**

Command Language Training  
Expires: Sept. 1, 1997

**97-01**

Conformance with Air Force Guidance on Organization Structure Codes and Unit Manpower Document Codes  
Expires: May 1, 1998

**97-02**

Organizational Level Strategic Planning  
Expires: July 31, 1998

**97-03**

Year 2000 Compliance  
Expires: Dec. 31, 1999

## AFOSI

**Special Agent Hagy**  
DSN 297-7746

**94-01**

Investigative Sufficiency and Documentation  
Expires: Indefinite

**96-01**

Crime and Counterintelligence Terrorism Information Systems Data Accuracy and Timeliness  
Expires: Indefinite

**96-03**

Unit Sorts Program Management  
Expires: Indefinite

**97-01**

AFOSI Compliance with Memorandum 10  
Expires: Indefinite

## 9AF

**Lt. Col. Barchie**  
DSN 965-2343/5510

**95-01**

Basic Airmanship  
Expires: Indefinite

## 12AF

**Tech. Sgt. Sellers**  
DSN 361-2331

**95-01**

Air Traffic Operations—Visual Flight Rules Pattern  
Expires: Indefinite

**95-02**

Basic Airmanship  
Expires: Indefinite

**97-01**

Supervisor of Flying  
Expires: Indefinite

# Fraud in the Air Force

**Capt. Steve Murray**

AFOSI/PA DSN 297-4728

The Air Force Office of Special Investigations investigates all types of fraud cases against the government. Fraud costs the Air Force millions of dollars annually. Most of our fraud investigations are in the procurement area: product substitution, diversion, mischarging, conflicts of interest, and bribery. Other types of fraud involve military and civilian members who have been caught cheating the Air Force. In these budget-tightening days, the impact of fraud, waste, and abuse is felt throughout the Air Force and we should all accept the responsibility to prevent it at every opportunity. Mutual command and AFOSI support, coupled with teamwork, are essential for successful prevention, detection, and neutralization of fraud. Here are some examples.

## Theft of Government Services

**Subject:** Civilian Female—  
Daughter of a Retired Military  
Member

**Synopsis:** The daughter of a retired military member obtained an unauthorized Department of Defense Form 1173, dependent identification card, following her

21st birthday. The woman used the guise that she was a full-time student in a university to obtain an exemption allowing her to have a dependent identification card after her 18th birthday. She had previously been enrolled in a university in the local area but was not presently attending. She stopped attending the university in May 1993 and obtained the card in September that year. She was using the identification card to obtain medical care at Air Force facilities and opened a deferred payment plan account at the base exchange. She charged the maximum amount of \$1,600 on her account and refused to pay it. When her father asked for the identification card back because she was not attending college, she refused, saying, "They can't do anything to me." AFOSI proved she was illegally in possession of a military dependent identification card and used it to defraud the government.

**Results:** She was indicted in federal court and accepted a pretrial diversion with a restitution of \$2,500.

## Base-Level Contract Fraud/ False Claims

**Subject:** Civilian Construction  
Contractor

**Synopsis:** The contractor failed to properly compact and shore up the areas around an Air Force building it had constructed at a waste treatment facility. AFOSI learned of the contract violation from a disgruntled employee and investigated. The investigation and

testing proved the contractor had not performed the work according to the contract. Not meeting the specifications on the compaction could have resulted in a significantly reduced life span of the facilities.

**Results:** The contractor settled out of federal civil court agreeing to reaccomplish the work according to specifications and pay for all testing expenses.

## False Claims

**Subject:** Civilian University and a  
Professor

**Synopsis:** A civilian university was the subcontractor for a research project funded with Air Force funds. The professor was in charge of the project at the university and certified all the claims for payment submitted to the Air Force. The contract was a cost-plus contract and the university had to certify its claims for its expenses. A university employee informed AFOSI that the employee identified in the claims had only worked a total of 80 hours on the project. The university billed the Air Force on this contract for more than 11 months of full-time work by the employee or approximately \$65,000. AFOSI's investigation showed that the professor knowingly inflated the employees' time on the project to reduce university overhead in other areas.

**Results:** Both the university and the professor settled with the Air Force out of federal court. The university paid \$97,612 and the professor paid \$12,500. ♦





# Summary of Recent Audits

**Mr. George Mellis**  
HQ AFAA/DOO DSN 426-8041

The Air Force Audit Agency provides professional and independent internal audit service to all levels of Air Force management. The reports summarized here discuss ways to improve the economy, effectiveness, and efficiency of installation-level operations and, therefore, may be useful to you. Air Force officials may request copies of these reports or a listing of recently published reports by contacting Mr. George Mellis at the number above, E-mailing to reports@af.pentagon.mil, or writing to HQ AFAA/DOO, 1125 Air Force Pentagon, Washington DC 20330-1125.

**Management of Base Reimbursements—Third Party Liability and Collection Program.** Auditors evaluated the third party liability and collection program at an Air Education and Training command installation to ensure the Air Force hospital received appropriate reimbursements from civilian insurance companies. The audit pointed out to management that although

hospital personnel requested patients to provide necessary information needed to bill civilian insurance companies, the information was not always in patients' medical records. In addition, personnel did not always bill insurance companies for patient visits when insurance information was provided. Management used the audit results to establish a quality improvement team to develop a more effective third party collection program. The combined efforts of management and audit will result in additional collections totaling almost \$1.3 million. (*Report of Audit 51597019*)

## **Host Country Reimbursements for the Off-Base Utility Cost Sharing Program.**

Auditors at an overseas installation reviewed the program to ensure the installation was receiving full reimbursement for utility payments. The auditors found that approximately 15 percent of the personnel occupying off-base rental quarters were not turning in their utility payment receipts needed for the Air Force to obtain reimbursement. The auditors advised the installation commander of the problem and its significant impact on base

funding. The commander took immediate action that will increase reimbursements to the base by more than \$2.2 million during the next 6 years. (*Report of Audit 23397026*)

**Management of Local Purchases.** The Air Force Office of Special Investigations requested the Air Force Audit Agency determine the magnitude of a possible fraud and theft related to the International Merchant Purchase Authorization Card, also known as the IMPAC, program. Auditors worked closely with the AFOSI to identify accountability problems for items purchased with the IMPAC and identified more than \$53,000 of stolen or missing government property. The auditors included color photograph examples in the audit report that illustrated employees removing items from the base in their vehicles and a personal garage built with material purchased using the IMPAC. Management worked with the auditors to establish more effective internal controls that will preclude and detect the misuse of future funds. (*Report of Audit 50397014*)♦



# Complaints

## How old is too old?

Lt. Col. George P. Clark  
HQ AFIA/JA DSN 246-1642  
clarkg@smtps.saia.af.mil

**H**ow old *is* too old? Certainly many inspectors general have contemplated this question when they receive a complaint by Airman X that his commander treated him unfairly four years ago. When is a complaint so old that it may be dismissed without an investigation? What important factors should be considered before dismissing a complaint? Isn't there some rule that says if a complaint is more than a certain number of years old, then it will always be dismissed? While complaints about incidents that are several years old present difficult problems, the inspector general has the discretion to investigate a complaint no matter how old it is.

The inspector general has no guidance available which says that after a certain period of time a complaint is too old to investigate, such as the rules governing the prosecution of

offenses under the Uniform Code of Military Justice or asserting a tort claim against the federal government. Under Article 43 of the code, with certain exceptions including death penalty offenses, a person charged with an offense is not liable to be tried by court-martial if the offense was committed more than five years before the receipt of sworn charges and specifications by an officer exercising summary court-martial jurisdiction over the command. Also, a person must file a tort claim against the federal government within two years of an injury or the claim will be dismissed. In both examples, one of the primary reasons for a time limit is that with the passage of time witnesses' memories fade; documents are retired, destroyed, or lost; and it is sometimes more difficult to locate witnesses or other relevant evidence. Air Force Instruction 90-301, *Inspector General Complaints*,

dated Feb. 1, 1997, provides guidance about when a complaint **may** be dismissed, but there is no set time limit—an inspector general must exercise sound judgment before dismissing a complaint.

Under the instruction, specifically paragraphs 1.2.2.2., 1.3.2.3., 1.4.3.3., 1.5.3.5., 1.7.1.6., and 2.2.1.4., an inspector general applies a three-part test to a complaint in order to determine whether it may be dismissed. First, the inspector general should perform a preliminary examination, or complaint analysis, to determine whether the complaint discloses a recognizable wrong or violation of law, regulation, or policy. If it does not, then it may be dismissed. Then the inspector general considers whether "... the individual is reporting the injustice or error more than 60 days after learning of the alleged wrong and no extraordinary circumstances exist to justify the delay ..."



There is no discussion in the instruction of these “extraordinary circumstances”—this is left to the discretion of the inspector general. Finally, the inspector general should consider the third element of the test: “... or, given the nature of the alleged wrong and passage of time, no special Air Force interests justify investigating the matter.” Paragraph 1.5.3.5. adds the following explanatory sentence after this final element: “The most important consideration is the potential to gather sufficient facts to make a determination on the allegation.”

The first element of the test helps the inspector general perform the most important step of any investigation, that is, framing the allegations. It requires a careful reading of the complaint; reviewing applicable policy directives, instructions, and statutes; and seeking the advice of the office of the staff judge advocate. The inspector general must consider whether the complaint and the reasonable inferences drawn therefrom reflect allegations of a wrong or wrongs.

There is little guidance available in the instruction to help an inspector general define the “extraordinary circumstances” mentioned in the


second element of the test. Those circumstances will probably differ from case to case. If a complainant has a long-term illness or is confined to a hospital after learning of the alleged wrong, these could amount to extraordinary circumstances. Another potentially extraordinary circumstance could be a complainant who says that they were afraid to file a complaint while under the direct supervision of the one against whom he or she complains. The second element of the test relies on the inspector general’s experience and good judgment.

The final element I call the “passage of time” element. The inspector general must consider “the nature of the alleged wrong and passage of time” and whether “special Air Force interests justify investigating the matter.” There are several variables to consider in this element. While witnesses’ memories tend to fade over time, it is common sense that memories of serious incidents would resist this tendency. A person may remember witnessing a murder much longer than they remember seeing a speeding automobile. The inspector general should consider whether any witnesses or documents will be available

and must also identify any special Air Force interests. Those interests will depend on the facts of an individual case. For example, an allegation that security investigations were ignored five years ago and security clearances were granted despite disqualifying information may be a special Air Force interest justifying an investigation.

Inspectors general will find important guidance in paragraph 1.5.3.5. in determining the impact of the passage of time. “The most important consideration is the potential to gather sufficient facts to make a determination on the allegation.” It would not be fair to the subject, complainant, or the Air Force to investigate allegations where there is little hope for resolution. They all rely on the inspector general’s maturity and judgment to make the right call. ♦

# Anatomy of a Management Review



Lt. Col. Peter J. Blaise  
HQ AFIA/FOS DSN 246-2098  
blaise@smtps.saia.af.mil

Ms. Marie Lopez  
HQ AFIA/FOR DSN 246-1919  
lopezm@smtps.saia.af.mil

**Y**ou've just read the notification message—a team from Headquarters, Air Force Inspection Agency, Kirtland Air Force Base, N.M., will be arriving at your base in 45 days as part of an Air Force-wide management review. What do you do? Is it time to “burn the midnight oil” getting ready for their visit or is it just another part of the daily routine? What about the inter-

views they want to conduct? Are you going to be evaluated and scored? Is this a potential opportunity to be “nailed” by the inspector general? What are they going to be looking at?

A management review is a fact-based, structured assessment of an Air Force program or process. Conducted by the Air Force Inspection Agency, the execution arm of the Air Force Inspector General, a management review is designed to respond to senior leadership concerns and assist them in taking appropriate action to resolve identified problems. Regardless of the topic, management reviews are designed to meet the quality standards for inspections from the

President's Council on Integrity and Efficiency, developed in March 1993.

Management review topics are generated from a variety of sources including the chief of staff, the air staff, the inspector general, major commands, and many others. Because the inspection agency could not possibly review all topics received in a given year, topics are evaluated regarding their relevancy to the core competencies of the Air Force. Care is also taken not to duplicate the effort of other organizations such as the Air Force Audit Agency or the General Accounting Office. Once selected for review, topics are then prioritized for accomplishment. To illustrate the scope of topics considered, recent management reviews have assessed Air Force outsourcing, personnel accountability, lean logistics, war readiness material, enhanced corporate structure, and hazardous material pharmacy implementation and operation. Once the Air Force Inspector General, also known as TIG, has approved topics for accomplishment, management review teams are formed and more detailed planning begins.

A key decision to make during initial management review planning will be regarding the final product of the assessment—either a written report or an annotated briefing. The annotated briefing is a new concept that eliminates lengthy and unnecessary coordination bottlenecks. Its strength is in its accuracy and speed—getting

the information to the decision maker as soon as it's analyzed. The completed assessment is created in a briefing format with "annotated" notes which detail the presentation. In itself, it is a completed management review report. The type of report and many other decisions will include input from the process owner, typically an air staff two-letter office. Planning will refine and expand the initial topic proposal to hone in on the purpose, scope, and methodology of the effort. Also, the plan will identify the number of team members, team composition, which may include augmenters, type of skills required, and travel itinerary.

A management review "officially" starts when the review team begins travel. Itineraries are typically a whirlwind of interviews with teams spending only one or two days at each base visited. The number of installations visited depends upon the scope of the review topic. A "small" effort may only include all major command headquarters. A more extensive review like hazardous material pharmacy implementation and operations employed three, five-person teams collecting data from 44 different organizations. Each organization visited becomes another data point for the review. After the team returns to the inspection agency, the tough job of analyzing the data, determining findings, and documenting the review begins in earnest.

This doesn't mean that the team

waits until all travel is complete to frame findings and recommendations. During the travel phase of an assessment, team members review data and observations to ensure the management review is technically complete and accurate. When travel is complete, the formal report writing begins. During the report writing or briefing preparation, the team will forward their initial draft to the air staff functionals to validate the facts upon which the assessment is based. Once the management review report or annotated briefing is complete and has met agency standards, it is forwarded to the Air Force Inspector General for coordination with the air staff process owners.

So there you have it. The management review has been completed and the Air Force process owner has been informed of the findings. Your role was only to be one of many data points in the review of an Air Force program. So what should you do to get ready for a visit from the Air Force Inspection Agency? Certainly there's no need to burn any more midnight oil than you may already be burning. Just be available to interview and be sure to provide accurate information to the inspectors—they'll appreciate it. More importantly, inspectors will be able to provide Air Force senior leaders the independent and objective assessments leaders need to improve our Air Force. ♦



U.S. AIR FORCE



1947 - 1997